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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=moldo^jW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -=113 - 
=
Panel 19. Emerging Models for Acquisition and 
Financial Management in Allied Nations 
Thursday, May 17, 2012  
11:15 a.m. – 
12:45 p.m. 
Chair: Al Volkman, Director, International Cooperation, Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
Discussant: Bernard Udis, Professor Emeritus, University of Colorado at Boulder 
International Dynamics of U.S. National Defense Acquisition and Budgetary 
Policy 
Marc DeVore, European University Institute 
Lawrence Jones, Naval Postgraduate School 
Implications for the U.S. of Anglo-French Defense Cooperation 
Peter Ito, David M. Moore, Peter Antill, Stuart Young, and Kevin Burgess 
Cranfield University 
Al Volkman—Mr. Volkman is the director of the International Cooperation for the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). He is responsible for establishing international 
armaments cooperation policy, ensuring that policy is properly implemented, and engaging with U.S. 
allies and friends around the world to achieve closer cooperation. 
Mr. Volkman has a long history in international cooperation beginning in the late 1970s when he 
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Boulder and a visiting research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. His distinguished 
academic career also included visiting appointments at the Air Force Academy, U.S. Arms Control & 
Disarmament Agency, and a NATO research fellowship. Professor Udis’ published work includes 
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focuses on competition and cooperation in the aerospace industries of the U.S. and the EU. 
[Bernard.Udis@colorado.edu] 
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Abstract 
The paper analyzes, from a predominantly UK perspective, the implications for the U.S. of the 
November 2, 2010, Anglo-French Defence Cooperation Treaty. The current pressures on 
British and French defence budgets were the primary driving force behind this cooperative 
effort. London and Paris have made steps toward improving joint efforts in a number of areas, 
with defence acquisition and industrial cooperation being prominent. In the UK, there appears 
to be strong political support at the highest levels, which has permeated to lower levels in the 
bureaucracy, while the UK defence industry appears to be cautiously optimistic about future 
business opportunities. 
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The impact of enhanced Anglo-French cooperation on the U.S. would appear to be largely 
favourable for Washington. Rather than providing a basis for weakened UK attention to the 
U.S., as some fear, the efforts by London and Paris will potentially generate greater national 
military capability from scarce resources and could serve as a vehicle for broader European 
efforts to enhance their defence capabilities. While multinational European military 
development projects are viewed with scepticism in the UK, the Anglo-French arrangement 
could strengthen the prospects for bilateral projects in which other European states may elect 
to participate. 
Introduction 
From the UK TV series Yes Minister, an exchange between senior civil servant Sir 
Humphrey Appleby and Minister James Hacker on fallout shelters: 
Appleby: Well, you have the weapons; you must have the shelters. 
Hacker: I sometimes wonder why we need the weapons. 
Appleby: Minister! You’re not a unilateralist? 
Hacker: I sometimes wonder, you know. 
Appleby: Well, then, you must resign from the government! 
Hacker:  Ah, no, no, no, no, no. I’m not that unilateralist! Anyway, the 
Americans will always protect us from the Russians, won’t they? 
Appleby: Russians? Who’s talking about the Russians? 
Hacker: Well, the independent deterrent. 
Appleby: It’s to protect us against the French! 
Hacker: The French?!! But they’re our allies! 
Appleby: Well, they might be now; but they were our mortal enemies for 
centuries, and old leopards don’t change their spots. 
“France has no friends, only interests.” – Charles de Gaulle  
“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are 
eternal and perpetual.” – Lord Palmerston 
Background 
On November 2, 2010, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy signed the Anglo-French Defence Co-Operation Treaty. It is comprised of 
an overarching treaty on defence cooperation, as well as a subordinate treaty related to joint 
nuclear facilities. The Letter of Intent signed by the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Defence 
Staff of both countries noted increasing interoperability between the armed forces of the UK 
and France as a major goal, as well as a number of separate joint initiatives. 
As the UK Ministry of Defence noted at the signing of the treaty, the measures 
agreed upon between the UK and France included work in the following areas: jointly 
developing a combined joint expeditionary force as a non-standing bilateral capability; 
developing the ability to deploy a UK–French-integrated carrier strike group incorporating 
assets owned by both countries (building primarily on maritime task group cooperation 
centered on the French carrier Charles de Gaulle); developing joint military doctrine and 
training programmes; extending bilateral cooperation on the acquisition of equipment and 
technologies; aligning (wherever possible) logistics arrangements; developing a stronger 
defence industrial and technology base; and enhancing joint working to defend against 
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emerging security concerns, such as cyber security. Overall, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
noted that the treaty is intended to enable the strengthening of operational linkages between 
the UK and French armed forces, sharing and pooling of materials and equipment, building 
of joint facilities, mutual access to defence markets, and increased industrial and 
technological cooperation (Ministry of Defence, 2010). 
It would be fair to say that previous attempts at Anglo-French cooperation, most 
recently the St. Malo declaration of December 1998, did not achieve the level of bilateral 
cooperation that many observers, or indeed London and Paris, initially anticipated. Nor, as 
will be discussed later, did St. Malo serve as the foundation for a larger European effort to 
generate defence capabilities, as had been anticipated by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair.  
In the case of the 2010 treaty, it is apparent that pressures on both countries’ military 
budgets have driven a shift in policy toward greater bilateral cooperation, particularly in the 
area of defence acquisition. Subsequently, the 2011 cooperation between London and Paris 
on military operations in Libya provided further indication of the benefits of greater bilateral 
coordination in the security area. On the other hand, the political dispute at the end of 2011 
regarding the reluctance of the UK to fully support Franco-German proposals to save the 
Euro led to concerns that a weakened overall Anglo-French political relationship would have 
an impact on future defence cooperation. However, the outcome of the February 2012 
Anglo-French Summit indicates that, despite the clash over the Euro, there appears to be 
continued determination to proceed with strengthened bilateral military cooperation.  
This paper seeks to assess, from a predominantly UK perspective, the potential 
implications for the U.S. of such enhanced Anglo-French defence cooperation, recognising 
that future problems in non-defence areas could put a brake on such efforts. The paper will 
mainly focus on defence cooperation and not the subordinate agreement regarding limited 
cooperation on nuclear weapons, although a brief examination of that document is 
necessary. The agreement addresses cooperation on the safety and security of nuclear 
weapons, stockpile certification, and countering nuclear and radiological terrorism. The 
immediate focus is the construction of joint radiographic-hydrodynamic facilities (Harries, 
2012, p. 13) and the initiatives were possible due to "long-term strategic shifts" (p. 21) but 
appear to be driven by "acute financial pressures, symptomatic of severe structural 
deficiencies" (p. 15). 
Past Successes and Failures 
As Jones (2011) noted, enhanced defence cooperation between the UK and France 
would appear to be a natural fit (p. 12). In 2010, the UK defence budget was around €43.4 
billion (£36.4 billion),1 and the French budget around €39.2 billion.2 Defence spending was 
between 3.5% and 5% of total government spending in both countries. The two combined 
defence budgets were just under half of all European defence spending (€82.6 billion 
compared to €193.5 billion) and accounted for around 75% of research and development 
spending (€6.48 billion compared to €8.56 billion; Pires, 2012). Jones (2011) added that 
RAND has estimated that by 2015, combined UK and French defence budgets could be 
around 65% of European Union (EU) defence spending (p. 12).  
There has been a long-standing record of Anglo-French defence coordination. The 
two established a High-Level Working Group in 2006 to promote closer cooperation in 
armaments programmes. They had already established a Franco-British European Air 
Group (1994), completed a Letter of Intent on naval cooperation (1996) and a Letter of 
                                                
1 On February 29, 2012, £1 equalled $1.59 or 1.194 Euros. 
2 On February 29, 2012, 1 Euro equalled $1.33 
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Intent on cooperation between the two armies (1997), and established a Joint Commission 
on Peacekeeping (1996) to harmonise peacekeeping procedures and doctrine.  
On the other hand, the history of Anglo-French defence acquisition cooperation has 
been spotty. There were successful programmes in the 1960s and 1970s (including the 
Puma and Gazelle helicopters and the Jaguar strike aircraft); and the establishment of 
MBDA, Europe’s leading manufacturer of guided weapons, in 2001, is a significant Anglo-
French creation. However, there have been notable failures. For example, the UK dropped 
out of the agreement with France and Germany for production of the Trigat anti-tank missile 
and the Trimilsatcom communications satellite programme. The UK also dropped out of the 
Horizon Common New Generation Frigate project, which included France and Italy (Antill, 
2011). 
Continued Commitment 
At the February 17, 2012, UK-France Summit, the two leaders reemphasized their 
commitment to do more in the area of defence cooperation. They noted that the 2010 
agreement has led to expansion of cooperation “in every major field: capabilities, industry, 
operations and intelligence” (para. 2). After analyzing the Libya operation, the two countries 
“have decided to prioritise our joint work in the key areas of command and control; 
information systems; intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance; and precision 
munitions” (para. 7). They also noted that the Libya experience reinforced the desire to set 
up the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (para. 9), and the two nations will establish a 
Combined Joint Forces Headquarters by 2016 (para. 14). 
It was notable that the most concrete results the two leaders cited were in specific 
areas of defence equipment. The desire for cooperation on unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) was made manifest with specific projects. With regard to the medium-altitude long 
endurance (MALE) drone, the two leaders announced that they would soon “place with BAE 
Systems and Dassault a jointly funded contract to study the technical risks associated with 
the MALE UAV" (para. 16). France also confirmed its “interest for the (British) Watchkeeper 
system” with an evaluation by France to begin this year (Chuter, 2012). 
There was also a reaffirmation of the pledge “to undertake in 2013 a joint Future 
Combat Air System Demonstration Programme that will set up a co-operation of strategic 
importance for the future of the European Combat Air Sector.” The document highlighted the 
contract let to the MBDA in December 2011 for two initial studies on a future cruise and an 
anti-ship weapon (para. 23). And it noted the intention to sign a contract in coming months 
for development and manufacture of the Future Anti-Ship Guided Weapon. 
Rationale: Policy Concurrence 
To determine what the Anglo-French Treaty may mean for the U.S., it is important to 
assess the driving forces behind this renewed effort at Anglo-French defence cooperation. 
The question, as formulated by Lindley-French (2010), is whether the Anglo-French Treaty 
is “a new departure or simply the latest twist in the centuries-old Anglo-French tussle for 
power? It is probably a bit of both” (p. 20). As he adds, "if Britain and France are to remain 
European powers with global reach they will need to share a vision of the big picture and 
stick to it” (p. 20). Put even more bluntly, but in terms that will probably resonate in 
Washington, 
defence cooperation between Britain and France is and must always be 
about power. The alternative is the decline of both countries, along with the 
rest of a Europe that seems to accept weakness as strength, equating an 
inability to act as meaning no need to act in the hope that danger simply 
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bypasses a continent too weak to matter any longer. (Lindley-French, 2010, 
p. 20) 
James Arbuthnot, the Chairman of the UK House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee, provided a similarly frank assessment in an overarching view of Anglo-French 
cooperation. Arbuthnot stated that the opportunity to cooperate with France is one that the 
UK cannot pass up. Certainly, he added, there are suspicions between the UK and France. 
The UK is always suspicious of what France can do or wishes to do. But Arbuthnot 
suggested that it may be best to view the UK and France like two brothers: although they 
quarrel, what unites them is more than what divides them.  
General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue, Chief of Defence Materiel at the UK Ministry of 
Defence until 2011, concurred that the UK and France have roughly the same capabilities 
and policy views. Bilateral cooperation is clearly logical for the UK. Assessing the agreement 
from the French perspective, he believed that it makes sense for Paris to collaborate with 
London. 
Rationale: Shortage of Money 
The impact of budget cuts for the UK and France in spurring a desire for defence 
cooperation cannot be overstated. Arbuthnot conceded that scarce resources are a key 
driving force for increased cooperation. But referring to the earlier point on policy, he 
emphasized that there are also shared threats and responses that make Anglo-French 
defence cooperation easier to develop. 
Indeed, Stevens (2011) has argued that the focus of the bilateral effort is not even to 
preserve defence capabilities, but “it is apparent that the strong aspiration will be to achieve 
a specific quantum of savings” (p. 6). In the UK, the Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR) mandated a cut of around 8% in UK defence spending in real terms over four years 
(HM Government, 2010; International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS], 2010a). As a 
result, Bickerton (2010) commented that “there is a chance that the budgetary crisis in the 
UK will push the government to recognise that potential savings can be made to the defence 
budget by cooperating more closely with France on armaments” (p. 121). 
With regard to France, Jones (2011) noted that “a senior French military officer 
believes that the defence cuts in France in future are likely to be ‘unprecedented’ with ‘big 
decisions’ on major programmes necessary” (p. 16). Stevens (2011) agreed that France is 
facing the same problem, noting that Defence Minister Morin announced a reduction of 3% 
out of the defence budget, which cut across a range of capabilities (p. 3). Perhaps more 
important, Stevens (2011) added that there is speculation that even without a change of 
government, there could be a further 4–5% reduction (p. 3). Such tight budgets necessitate 
a focus on how best to generate military capability from scarce resources. Bickerton (2010) 
noted that “the French Government has also been interested above all in capabilities and 
force effectiveness” (p. 115).  
However, some analysts warn against placing too much emphasis on funding 
problems as the motivator behind the Anglo-French Treaty, arguing that there are more 
fundamental issues involved. Jones (2011) argued that “it would be wrong to see Franco-
British defence cooperation as driven purely by a short-term need to balance the books” (p. 
7), outlining three long-term trends that challenge traditional thinking in London and Paris. 
First, “defence budgets have not been funded to compensate for the rising cost of military 
capability.” Second, the security environment makes it “all but impossible to make the 
political case for more defence spending.” Finally, “flat or lower spending combined with 
increasingly expensive technology undermines the viability of national, and even 
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multinational, industries.” Jones (2011) asserted that these factors threaten British and 
French national defence industrial capabilities and, potentially, operational autonomy (p. 7).  
If the Anglo-French treaty is indeed driven purely by immediate budgetary 
considerations, this raises questions regarding the long-term prospects of this partnership. 
As Gomis (2011) noted, 
The Franco-British treaties, although signed for a 50-year period, focus on 
the short-term need for capabilities. A number of crucial questions therefore 
remain. What will happen when the British and French economies recover? 
Will the two countries’ strategic differences re-emerge? Will they return to old 
habits of more protectionism and nationalism in the defence realm? Will both 
governments gradually abandon the increased financial imperative in defence 
spending recently induced by budgetary austerity? (p. 18) 
As a partial response, Jones (2011) cited the overarching political, military, and 
industrial considerations that are critical to London and Paris, commenting,  
For now, Franco-British defence cooperation is driven primarily by an 
aspiration in both countries to retain access to a full spectrum of military 
capabilities, sufficient to contribute strategic effect and retain credibility in the 
eyes of the United States, and therefore NATO. A secondary motive is to 
sustain their national defence capabilities for core sovereign obligations. A 
third is to contribute to bilateral and European missions, as well as to sustain 
general European military capabilities for an uncertain future. (p. 21) 
Rationale: Practical Defence Cooperation 
It also can be argued that the intentions behind this latest Anglo-French effort are 
quite practical and are focused on the need to simply maintain credible military capabilities. 
Jones (2011) stated that the motivation 
is to maintain French and British aspirations to power projection and to 
military credibility in the eyes of the United States. The many similarities and 
shared vital interests of France and the UK underpin, but do not drive, the 
initiative. The end-goal is to retain access to military capability, whether that 
is through mutual dependence on each other's industrial base and armed 
forces, or through pooling and sharing capability. (p. 5) 
Reinforcing the point that there are practical aspects to the cooperation, Jones 
(2011) asserted that although London and Paris want to be seen as credible partners by 
Washington, national sovereignty is also a key consideration. The UK and France are driven 
by the motivation of retaining access “to a full range of capabilities to pursue independent 
foreign policies” (Jones, 2011, p. 8). 
Echoing the point of practical areas for developing capabilities, one UK official 
commented that there is potential with regard to better Anglo-French cooperation in areas 
such as joint support and training. There could be more use of simulators, for example, as 
well as opportunities for sharing facilities. With regard to practical examples of defence 
cooperation, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS; 2010b) noted that the UK 
and France have an agreement to develop a common support plan for the A-400M 
transport, and there is discussion of an arrangement whereby France could use some of the 
extra capacity in the UK Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=moldo^jW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -=144 - 
=
Political Leadership Is Key 
There appears to be widespread agreement that political leadership in London and 
Paris is essential to making bilateral cooperation work. That certainly was the case in 
previous agreements, such as St. Malo, which also highlighted the significance of the 
rationale (at least from the UK perspective) behind pursuing greater Anglo-French defence 
cooperation. With regard to St. Malo, Bickerton (2010) noted that “the wars in Yugoslavia 
and rising tensions in Kosovo had pushed Tony Blair towards a Franco-British defence 
agreement in order to enhance the EU's capabilities for intervention” (p. 120). Shearer 
(2000) concurred that the Bosnia crisis was a “major challenge to Britain’s defence identity” 
(p. 288) and strengthened “Britain’s sense of belonging to a European political community.” 
Later, the Kosovo crisis was a key factor for Blair, as it made apparent “Europe's relative 
military impotence” (Shearer, 2000, p. 293). 
The St. Malo example highlights two issues. The first issue is whether Anglo-French 
defence cooperation can survive if bilateral relations are strained over other issues. As 
noted by one writer, the St. Malo spirit was dashed by the sharp policy divisions regarding 
Iraq and reflected the divergent political views in London and Paris (Howorth, 2003, p. 188). 
The results of the initial test for the 2010 agreement would seem to provide grounds for 
optimism. Even after the critical dispute over the package to support the Euro, the results of 
the 2012 Anglo-French Summit were quite positive. 
The second issue is the extent to which this bilateral push is a creation of the political 
leadership. If that is indeed the case, that raises the two questions of (1) whether bilateral 
cooperation has become embedded as business as usual in the two bureaucracies, and (2) 
whether it can survive a change in leadership. The mixed views on the first question are 
provided later. On the second question, this leads, from the UK perspective, to the 
immediate question of the extent to which French enthusiasm will continue if Sarkozy does 
not stay on as President. Writing about the French return to the NATO-integrated military 
command, Bickerton (2010) noted that from the UK perspective, there is a question of 
whether the French attitude regarding the U.S. and NATO “goes much further than the 
President himself and much will depend on whether or not Sarkozy is able to win a second 
term” (p. 117). 
Addressing these issues, Arbuthnot stressed that the high-level political push on 
Anglo-French cooperation is essential, particularly with regard to bilateral commercial 
success. At summits, there is a drive to get deliverables and action. That has a direct impact 
on efforts that lead to industry taking concrete steps. That would certainly appear to be 
apparent in the various defence industrial initiatives announced in 2012. 
Arbuthnot conceded that the difficulties regarding the Euro could well remain a 
critical factor, which leads to questions regarding the personal relationship between 
Cameron and Sarkozy. He emphasized, however, that the press always seizes on personal 
relationships as the decisive factor, while he believes the drive for bilateral cooperation goes 
deeper than that. Arbuthnot noted that when he and the Deputy Chair of the Defence Select 
Committee went to Paris soon after the dispute over the Euro, UK and French officials were 
very clearly determined to ensure that bilateral defence cooperation would continue. 
On the question of the level of support for bilateral cooperation below the political 
leadership, O’Donoghue commented that there are lots of challenges and mistrust which 
must be overcome. He asserted that the MoD leadership has bought into Anglo-French 
cooperation. But with regard to farther down in the UK bureaucracies, the level of support is 
mixed, as some individuals are pro-U.S. and some are pro-Europe. O’Donoghue stressed 
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that the point is that these are not mutually exclusive but acknowledged that these differing 
views exist. 
Taking a different perspective on the issue, a UK official noted that Anglo-French 
defence cooperation will work as well as the politicians want it to work. He cited as a good 
example the establishment of the Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en matiere 
d'Armement (OCCAR), which was set up to handle the through-life management of 
collaborative European defence equipment programmes. The OCCAR has six European 
members, including the UK and France. The UK official noted that there was a big political 
push to establish the OCCAR and a lot of support at that time. The intention was to change 
European defence acquisition, and steps were taken quickly to achieve that goal. It had 
impressive results, and a treaty was concluded. 
But then, noted the UK official, the politicians walked away and left it to the 
bureaucrats to manage; and in the absence of political leadership, the result was an ethos of 
not making decisions. Each country wanted to make things work in its own way, while no-
one was there “to bang heads together.” The UK official commented that this would apply to 
any effort, and the key is whether there is real political support in London and Paris to make 
Anglo-French defence cooperation work. 
And in the view of this UK official, this is still an open question. This could still be a 
case of just good words and not following up. Below the political level, there is a lot of 
scepticism in the UK MoD and UK defence industry about big ticket items, especially due to 
doubts about whether the Anglo-French initiative will be enduring. In addition, he reiterated 
the point that defence cooperation is subject to developments in non-defence areas, such as 
the Euro and elections. 
On that count, Jones (2011) noted that “if bureaucratic and industrial obstacles can 
be overcome, there is a clear path to substantial cost savings and interoperability gains” (p. 
35). However, he appears to agree with O’Donoghue and the UK official that there is a risk 
that the Anglo-French effort could flounder due to simple bureaucratic inertia: 
Ministries of Defence in both London and Paris have highly effective 'immune 
systems', notorious for rejecting new ideas. It can be challenging enough to 
embed change within the confines of a single department, never mind across 
different departments in two different countries. It is only natural that such a 
process will meet resistance from those who will tend to protect their 
functions and be cautious of different ways of working. (Jones, 2011, p. 33) 
Impact of Libya 
It is apparent that the Anglo-French efforts in the military operation regarding Libya 
have been a shot in the arm for bilateral defence cooperation. Nick Harvey, UK Minister for 
the Armed Forces, told a UK Parliamentary Committee that Anglo-French cooperation on 
Libya was “undoubtedly . . . a significant success” (IISS, 2011b). He went on to note that 
“we are pleased to have demonstrated the ability of the UK and France to act together in a 
leading role in the way that we have, which is encouraging for the future.” 
Certainly, there were positive aspects of the Libya experience. For example, there 
was solid UK-French air and maritime cooperation. However, commentators noted that the 
Libya campaign exposed the problems that remain in bilateral military cooperation. There 
were difficulties in communications, different concepts of operation, gaps in intelligence 
sharing, and a problem with aligning political ambition and military capabilities. Perhaps 
most important were the problems in sharing classified information. Whether that particular 
issue can be resolved can come down to the question of whether the UK can expand its 
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exchanges with Paris while not risking its arrangements with Washington (IISS, 2011b). 
Jones (2011) noted that there are agreements in place between the UK and France to share 
intelligence, but they are “lower-key” (p. 13), and Lindley-French noted that “enhanced 
intelligence-sharing will be critical” to enhanced bilateral cooperation, and was noticeable by 
its absence in the 2010 agreement (p. 16). 
Taking a larger perspective on the lessons from the Libya experience, Arbuthnot 
noted that the U.S. took a positive step by giving Europeans the opportunity to take the lead. 
Ultimately, the U.S. provided assistance when it became necessary to address European 
shortfalls. But the Libya operation, stressed Arbuthnot, reminded Europeans of their 
obligations, highlighted the gaps in their military capabilities, and subsequently allowed the 
U.S. to press Europe to fill those gaps. 
Practical Impediments 
The commentary on weaknesses in intelligence sharing during Libya operations 
highlights some of the practical difficulties with enhancing defence cooperation. For 
example, there continue to be comments about the extent to which the UK and France might 
be able to work together with regard to their aircraft carriers. One area the 2010 agreement 
cited is the development of an integrated carrier strike group. The UK decided in its SDSR 
that it would continue with the construction of two carriers, but potentially bring only one into 
service. Some commentators have noted that the UK decision to get the F-35C carrier 
version of the Joint Strike Fighter might allow the UK’s F-35Cs to land on the French 
Charles de Gaulle (IISS, 2010a). 
Assessing such an idea, O’Donoghue asked what kind of Anglo-French cooperation 
on aircraft carriers was really possible. He asked, as a practical matter, whether there is 
enough room on the carriers for combined crews. O’Donoghue noted that when he saw how 
the U.S. carrier George Washington operated, it appeared to be chaos, but it worked due to 
years of training. With any combination of Anglo-French planes and carriers, there would be 
the same kind of chaos, but without the years of training. A French carrier alongside a UK 
carrier would be a separate issue, added O’Donoghue. But he questioned whether it is really 
realistic to try to fly two different types of aircraft off of one carrier. 
Continuing on with the issue of practical impediments and addressing it at a higher 
level, O'Donoghue noted that the French budget and financial system is different from that of 
the UK. While the larger goal may be to come together, the two processes are different, and 
that has an impact. The key, stressed O'Donoghue, is to find the common ground that 
allows possible solutions and cooperation to go forward. 
Multinational Defence Cooperation in General 
Before turning from the area of practical defence cooperation to defence industrial 
cooperation, it is worthwhile to assess the general UK experience with regard to 
multinational defence industrial cooperation. In general, the UK record on multinational 
defence acquisition has been beneficial to the UK. A 2001 report from the National Audit 
Office (NAO; 2001), cited by a UK official as still the best assessment on benefits to the UK 
of multinational defence cooperation, noted that 
cooperation in defence research offers economic and technology benefits, 
generating a 5:1 return on the Department's £40 million annual investment on 
joint research programmes and providing knowledge with an annual value of 
approximately £280 million at minimal cost through information exchange 
programmes. (p. 1) 
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In general terms, the NAO (2001) assessed that cooperative defence acquisition can 
bring economic benefits due to cost-sharing and economies of scale. Moreover, it can 
enhance interoperability with allies as well as develop technological competence and 
influence industrial restructuring (NAO, 2001, p. 1). With regard to the OCCAR, the NAO 
(2001) noted that it offers “the opportunity for significant improvements in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of European cooperative procurement” (p. 35). It commented that the OCCAR 
was intended to serve as the body that would place contracts, manage cooperative 
European acquisition programs, and generate European cooperative military programmes.  
However, it is notable that the overall conclusions by the NAO (2001) on 
multinational defence cooperation are that  
cooperation adds another layer of complexity to the challenge of procuring 
equipments within time, cost and performance parameters and subsequently 
supporting them in-service. The track record of defence equipment 
cooperation to date has been mixed. Whilst there have been economic, 
political, military and industrial benefits, on significant numbers of cooperative 
procurement programmes, not all of the potential benefits have been 
secured. (p. 5) 
Industrial Cooperation Is Key 
As noted previously, the 2012 Summit declaration placed great emphasis on bilateral 
defence industrial cooperation, and the case can be made that industrial cooperation may, 
over the long haul, be more valuable than practical military cooperation. For that reason, it is 
notable that “the treaties have been warmly received by the defence industries of both 
countries” (Gomis, 2011, p. 16). 
One of the goals of expanded bilateral cooperation was to provide some support for 
defence industries in both countries, which are facing reduced defence spending. As some 
commentators noted, "By moving closer to commonly set equipment requirements, the 
treaty was intended to promote stepped-up cross-channel industrial ties between the two 
nations' defence-aerospace sectors” (IISS, 2011b). 
At the lower level, noted a UK official, there have been successful bilateral projects. 
However, they do not get much attention, citing marine engines as a good example. They 
are not high-profile items, but they are built on an existing relationship, and there is a solid 
commercial basis for the work. Cooperation works, emphasized the official, but because of 
that commercial logic. Critically, this removes the bureaucracy as a hindrance. Citing 
another example, the UK official asserted that MBDA is a good and more prominent 
example of a result of Anglo-French political commitment.  
The question arises as to whether Anglo-French industrial cooperation actually is 
possible across the board or might have to be limited to smaller, non-controversial areas 
such as marine engines and, if it has broader applicability, how would the UK and France 
establish “red lines” to protect national interests? Is it a case of deciding the items that are 
appropriate for cooperation? Or is it a case of establishing processes to limit activities, such 
as information sharing? O’Donoghue came down strongly in favour of deciding the specific 
items, emphasizing that “if you select the right equipment, there are no red lines. If there are 
red lines, you have pushed the wrong equipment.” 
Impediments to Industrial Cooperation 
But if the critical long-term aspect of Anglo-French cooperation is on defence 
procurement, there are numerous obstacles, as commentators have noted. One 
commentator, Carre (2001), wrote soon after St. Malo that 
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sensible defence procurement between Britain and France means that those 
two proud and sometimes arrogant nations have to concede political, 
technical and manufacturing grounds to one another and accept some form 
of loss of independence, concessions on foreign policy, intrusions in the 
shaping of industry, and last but not least the inevitable jobs casualties, a 
price that fewer and fewer politicians are prepared to pay. (p. 6) 
There are clear differences in the views on defence procurement. France has 
“traditionally retained a protectionist attitude towards its defence sector, which is in large 
part owned by the state, in line with the country’s tradition of Colbertian economic policies in 
which the central government retains a central role” (Gomis, 2011, p. 17). The UK approach 
has been to allow for the defence market to be free. Moreover, while France’s industrial 
relations “are more oriented towards Europe,” UK industries retain strong ties with the U.S. 
market (Gomis, 2011, p. 17). 
As Carre (2001) noted, UK defence procurement is “a clear means to a clear end—
that is to equip the defence forces” (p. 7). On the other hand, Carre (2001) noted that the 
French policy aim is  
being pro-active in contributing to the building of a European defence base 
with a strong French footprint. This is mainly to be able to compete and/or 
establish partnerships with U.S. companies, on an equal foothold. The means 
to achieve this goal remains a direct interventionist policy, enforced by an 
elite administration. Thus, French defence procurement has been and 
remains an element to achieve this ultimate political goal of creating a 
European defence force equipped with, at worst, inter-operable systems and, 
at best, the same weapons... In such an environment, economic rationale, 
efficiency and defence companies' profits have been, for some years, the 
least of the concerns for the French State. (p. 7) 
Moreover, there are fundamental conflicts between the behaviours of the two 
countries regarding defence acquisition. A UK official noted that there are differences in the 
way the two countries approach efforts at defence cooperation. The UK declares its 
intention for cooperation early. In contrast, the French declare it late when they frankly have 
a solution they want others to buy into. 
There are many practical hurdles to be overcome in obtaining greater defence 
industrial cooperation. Lindley-French noted that then-UK Defence Secretary Fox 
highlighted the need for UK firms to have better access to French military procurement 
projects (p. 17). For their part, the French “regard the British as unreliable partners, too 
subject to political whim and the sudden cancellation of or adjustment to programmes” (p. 
17). Having said that, Lindley-French reinforced the point that 
even a cursory analysis of the defence economics and costs of production in 
Britain and France suggests that it is only through greater synergy between 
their defence industries that any MoDicum of affordability and security of 
supply and re-supply will be assured. (p. 17) 
Arbuthnot concurred with many of the points noted above. France has a directed 
industrial strategy, and the French government owns a good chunk of the French defence 
industry. The UK does not have that kind of ownership pattern, and the UK defence market 
is open. But Arbuthnot emphasized that these are not insurmountable obstacles, and the 
value of the bilateral defence cooperation should be considerable and can overcome those 
obstacles, stressing that there is a fundamental logic for Anglo-French cooperation. 
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Taking a different perspective, O’Donoghue commented that industry has to change, 
and the MoDs in London and Paris need to work to smooth the path. He noted that 
government cannot change the goals of industry, but it can influence how industry’s goals 
evolve. For example, the UK does not necessarily want the ability to cut steel for future 
armoured vehicles. What it needs is the ability to integrate complex systems and sub-
systems. If that is a clear government policy, industry will then change its perspective. 
O’Donoghue also noted that this is even more important regarding larger policy 
issues. If the UK gives up a logistical capability, it cannot get it back, so the UK has to be 
clear about what it wants to do. Industry faces a similar situation. O’Donoghue stressed that 
a big request is being made of the UK defence industry. Will it get rid of 50% of its 
engineers? Will it actually rely on the French over the long haul? 
Returning to the importance of leadership, a UK official emphasized that big political 
statements and commitments are critical to make better Anglo-French commercial 
relationships. If the political commitment is weakened, there can be work on minor, lower 
level items, but the big ticket projects will not happen, and this is precisely the area where 
Europe has expertise, perhaps even a comparative advantage and needs to focus its 
attention. 
Cutting-Edge Defence Technology 
The 2012 Summit declaration had a particular focus on Anglo-French high-tech 
defence cooperation. One of the areas in which there is particular emphasis is on UAVs. On 
MALE UAVs, commentators have noted that there is a business logic to the arrangement, 
as BAE Systems and Dassault have capabilities in the area, and their domestic markets 
would generate a market of only some 40–50 MALE UAVs (IISS, 2010b). Indeed, should 
MALE work, there is the possibility of more collaboration on unmanned combat air vehicles, 
and such work would probably be important to maintaining the skills of European industry 
(IISS, 2011b). Returning to the practical considerations noted above, what will be interesting 
to observe is whether this cooperation will be possible in light of competition in other areas, 
for example, after India selected the Rafale from Dassault over the Eurofighter from BAE 
Systems as its preferred choice for its new fighter in late 2011. 
Certainly, the argument could be made that the French approach to long-term 
planning with regard to defence technology could appeal to the UK. As Carre (2001) noted, 
the French MoD has upwards of a 30-year prospective plan, which is updated annually (p. 
9). In the case of the UK, the government reconfirmed through its white paper “National 
Security Through Technology” (MoD, 2012, p. 9) that it would maintain its baseline of 
spending 1.2% of its defence budget on science and technology (around £400 million 
annually). 
In addition, Lindley-French highlighted the agreement concerning a 10-year strategic 
plan for the UK and French Complex Weapons sector, commenting that it “makes sense if it 
does lead to the creation of a single European prime contractor (and realizes 30% savings 
as envisaged)” (p. 17). A UK official noted that the UAV area is one in which France is trying 
to bring the UK into a joint venture and where there is potentially substantial growth. But 
harkening back to the point noted above, the broader cost to the UK has to be considered 
and a clear policy decision must be made. 
Arbuthnot asserted that work in this high-tech area is important in a broader Western 
context. Large U.S. firms clearly have an advantage over European companies. But high-
quality defence research is broadly needed, and that cannot be obtained with just small UK 
and French firms. Thus, there is logic to UK-French cooperation in this expensive, high-tech 
area. However, he conceded, although there are benefits of scale, there is also a natural 
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suspicion. There is a mutual concern in France and the UK that the other is stealing 
intellectual property. Those suspicions have to be overcome by openness, noted Arbuthnot, 
and both a top-down and bottom-up approach for further bilateral cooperation is needed to 
spur progress and generate that transparency. In that regard, Libya served as practical 
experience to increase that level of trust and obtain more openness by both sides. 
O’Donoghue commented that three years ago, it was clear to officials in the UK and 
France that more industrial cooperation, in general, would be mutually beneficial. Citing 
complex weapons specifically, he said there are clear options, and it is far too expensive for 
each country to work in this area separately. True, he noted, the UK could simply have 
bought high-tech U.S. equipment. But the other option was to have an arrangement 
between Paris and London, with each spending as much as possible to generate an Anglo-
French complex weapons capability. 
It took a long time for defence industries in the UK and France to recognise the 
benefits of such collaboration, admitted O’Donoghue. He concurred with the point Arbuthnot 
made about obstacles due to attitudes and behaviours. But he asserted that a lot of the 
problem may have been due to media hype about potential conflicts. Addressing practical 
problems, O’Donoghue cited intellectual property rights and third party sales, commenting 
that London and Paris have to generate arrangements to smooth obstacles in these and 
other areas for industry.  
Perhaps most important, up to this point, noted O’Donoghue, is that industry has not 
put its weight behind Anglo-French cooperation. It will be interesting to see whether they are 
ready to do so from now on. In short, asserted O’Donoghue, it is not clear whether industry 
has “crossed the Rubicon” and is ready to embrace bilateral cooperation; but in his view, 
they certainly need to do so. Industry, he asserted flatly, has to get that message. 
Reaction of Other Europeans 
The Anglo-French agreement has not been met with universal approval, especially 
as it involves the two largest defence budgets in Europe seeking to cooperate more with 
each other, rather than working to develop European capabilities. Gomis (2011) notes that 
“reactions in Berlin have demonstrated Germany’s unease over an exclusive Franco-British 
agreement” (p. 14). A UK official agreed that Anglo-French cooperation has generated 
tensions within the rest of Europe. Italy and others are “incensed.” But he added that the 
question to be asked of the other Europeans is simple: who has the money? 
Consideration has now turned to the question of whether the bilateral efforts could 
potentially provide an impetus to a larger European effort to generate defence capabilities. 
One writer commented that “given the difficulties encountered in defence procurement in the 
past decade, the Franco-British treaties can nonetheless be seen as a first salutary step 
towards more joint action in European defence procurement” (Gomis, 2011, p. 17). Lindley-
French argued that  
Anglo-French defence cooperation would be a pioneer group par excellence 
for the rest of Europe. Thus permanent structured cooperation and reinforced 
cooperation, as stipulated in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, would assist Britain and 
France to create a European strategic culture worthy of the name. (p. 14) 
One commentator noted that “the enhancement of Franco-British common efforts will 
benefit the EU by stemming the deterioration of British and French military capabilities, on 
which EU deployments rely” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 428). The effort has significance as 
London is “particularly exasperated by its European partners inertia; but even in Paris 
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frustrations are mounting” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 428) regarding the absence of effort in the 
rest of Europe to maintain defence capabilities. 
Arriving at a similar destination through a different route, Jones (2011) asserted that 
the primary motivation for the Anglo-French initiative is “not to produce a greater or more 
effective ‘European’ military capability” (p. 5). He noted that it could possibly “cause divisions 
among European states if the Franco-British relationship is seen as too exclusive and not 
sufficiently concerned with wider European security” (p. 5). However, Jones (2011) also 
noted that Anglo-French cooperation could indeed be “a road-map to more effective 
European defence cooperation, based on deeper capability planning and mutual 
dependency” (p. 5). Indeed, taking the point further, he noted that unless Europe ascertains 
“how, and, indeed, whether, the initiatives that France and the UK embark on can work in 
practice, wider European defence cooperation has little hope of delivering anything” (Jones, 
2011, pp. 5–6). 
It is notable that there is speculation that the request for proposals for the MALE 
UAV could be open to other European (as well as possibly U.S) firms (IISS, 2011b), and 
there is the possibility that broader cooperation could be expanded. However, other 
commentators note that the UK has been burned by multinational European projects like the 
A-400M and will not be enthusiastic about such expanded projects (IISS, 2011b). 
Indeed, it appears that the UK has had enough of projects involving a number of 
European partners. A commentator from the IISS (2011a) stated, “Having tired of the delays 
and haggling that often accompany multilateral European procurements, the UK now firmly 
prefers collaborative procurement on a bilateral basis.” Jones (2011) noted that there is “a 
pragmatic assumption that bilateralism between 'natural partners' ought to work more 
effectively than a multilateral approach” (p. 8). He added that the UK “now prefers bilateral 
programmes as a matter of policy, on the grounds that they are more ‘straightforward’” 
(Jones, 2011, p. 15).  
The trend of UK reluctance to participate in Europe-wide defence efforts, which had 
already begun under the previous Labour government, has continued. Although there are 
many factors, it has been argued that the principal motivating force is  
the belief, widely held in government and military circles, that efforts in this 
direction are an inefficient use of Britain’s limited resources—a belief resulting 
from years of frustrations at the lack of serious commitment to defence on the 
part of many European countries. (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 420) 
Then-UK Defence Secretary Fox stated in September 2011 that the Anglo-French 
arrangement will not be copied between the UK and other Europeans, stating, “The UK-
French agreement is not a prototype for wider European defence, but I do think it might be 
useful in setting an example to other European nations who want to work closely together” 
(Bell, 2011). That view reflects the fact that the SDSR only specifically cited France (MoD, p. 
60) along with the U.S. as countries with which the UK would be working assiduously to 
strengthen bilateral efforts. 
In line with the points above, Arbuthnot commented that it is too early to say if there 
would be more European initiatives as a result of the Anglo-French agreement. He thought 
that European efforts would probably expand a little as a result but emphasized that the 
extent of the expansion depends on how others are willing to go along with the Anglo-
French framework. Arbuthnot firmly noted that it is definitely not desirable to have a new 
framework that destroys the UK-French arrangement. 
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The main idea, stressed Arbuthnot, is to get the two big European countries to work 
together. If bringing in others means the dilution of Anglo-French cooperation, this would not 
be acceptable. Other European states should decide whether to join the existing 
arrangement. As it stands, he noted, Italy is “cross” about the Anglo-French cooperation, 
Spain is not happy, and Germany would like to be involved. With regard to defence 
industrial cooperation, it must be based on an arrangement between the UK and France, or 
British and French firms, with other European states or firms then joining. 
O’Donoghue concurred strongly with Arbuthnot, stating that he dislikes multinational 
projects but supports bilateral programmes. Mistakes in past efforts on joint cooperation 
could and should be fixed. But with regard to future European efforts in defence 
cooperation, the Anglo-French path is the one and only road that should be followed. 
It is important to note that other analysts who share that view believe this means the 
death of any European efforts to maintain a defence capability and acknowledgment that 
only bilateral efforts will work. O’Donnell (2011) argued that the agreement “could come to 
symbolize the demise of EU defence efforts” as “the summit took place against the backdrop 
of a loss of interest in the CSDP within Paris and, to an even greater extent, London” (p. 
433). 
It appears for that very reason to be in the interest of the U.S. that Anglo-French 
defence cooperation proceed. It is arguably the only way in which European defence 
capabilities can be maintained. O’Donnell (2011) noted that “little demonstration is required 
of the hollowness of EU defence cooperation without the full support of Britain and France” 
(p. 428) and flatly stated that  
EU defence efforts are doomed to flounder if there is no enthusiasm from the 
only two EU countries with extensive experience in expeditionary warfare and 
global ambitions in security, and which between them account for nearly half 
of Europe’s defence spending. (p. 429) 
U.S. Interest 
And therein lies the reason for the U.S. to support the Anglo-French efforts and hope 
that they will succeed. To return to the paper topic, the implications for the U.S. of Anglo-
French cooperation are quite clear: they constitute the best hope of providing a vehicle or 
framework for European Allies to develop defence capabilities. With European defence 
budgets having shrunk over the last decade, economic difficulties making it unlikely that 
there will be any major increases in the near future, and an absence of political will to spend 
large sums on defence, one hope for the U.S. of getting more defence capabilities out of its 
European Allies is that others will join an effort driven by London and Paris. 
Commentators have noted that one of the key conditions for success for the Anglo-
French treaty includes the “support of the United States, based on the understanding that 
the Franco-British treaties do not clash with its global role but will rather reinforce it” (Gomis, 
2011, p. 4). Gomis (2011) added later that “Washington may be tempted to view this 
partnership as competition, but it is very unlikely to be the case” and asserted that “the 
Franco-British treaties are useful for European defence and should not be opposed” (p. 12). 
Indeed, the argument is made that the U.S. “has a crucial role to play in making the case for 
the treaties and other examples of bilateral cooperation that would benefit both NATO and 
the EU” (p. 19). 
Indeed, Prime Minister Cameron emphasized the benefit of the treaty to U.S. 
interests when he stated that “they want European countries like France and Britain to come 
together and share defence resources so that we actually have greater capabilities. . . . So I 
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think this will get a very warm welcome in Washington” (Gomis, 2011, p. 11). One 
commentator asserted that “it is generally recognized that Washington perceives the Anglo-
French Defence Treaty as a potential catalyst for creating the greater cooperation on 
conventional capabilities in Europe” (Stevens, 2011, p. 4). 
Those who are particularly critical about European capabilities focus on the 
possibilities in the Anglo-French treaty. Lindley-French frankly noted that “the central 
challenge for both Britain and France is that much of the European continent remains on 
strategic vacation” (p. 9). Continuing on, he argued that “at the very least, Anglo-French 
defence cooperation will need to regenerate a European strategic culture” (p. 9). He also 
made the point that the Anglo-French Treaty  
only makes political sense if it is seen as an attempt to kick-start Europe as a 
whole into considering its strategic future; and that will require a degree of 
political solidarity and consistency for which neither London nor Paris are 
renowned. (Lindley-French, p. 4) 
He bluntly stated that “Franco-British defence cooperation is thus not just vital for 
London and Paris but for a Europe that is dangerously and strategically adrift” (p. 5). 
Arbuthnot also asserted that the U.S. should encourage Anglo-French cooperation, 
noting that it is likely to maximise defence output for the UK and France, which would benefit 
the U.S. And it could increase the defence output of other European countries if others are 
willing to sign on to the Anglo-French framework. Arbuthnot commented that his hope is that 
the U.S. will welcome the idea that Allies are working together to increase military 
capabilities. As for what concrete steps it should take with regard to Anglo-French 
cooperation, Arbuthnot stated that the U.S. could simply take “a benign watching brief.” 
O’Donoghue echoed the point that Anglo-French cooperation is not an either/or 
situation vis-à-vis the U.S. If Europe “gets its act together,” it would be better for the U.S. 
Indeed, O’Donoghue said that his message to the U.S. would be that both the UK and 
France will both be better allies for the U.S. if they engaged in more robust defence 
cooperation. Without collaboration, they will just lose capabilities and it will be harder to 
generate more efficient use of resources. 
He went on to posit that it may be better for the West to have different capabilities. 
O’Donoghue stressed that the UK and France have superb engineers. Indeed, some UK 
equipment and technology is better than that produced in the U.S. And in some capability 
areas, noted O’Donoghue, made in the U.S.A is not necessarily the best label, and a 
European label might be better. The U.S. should welcome an Anglo-French military-industry 
capability, posited O’Donoghue. Europe is not big enough to have national defence 
industrial competition. But pan-European competition is possible. An Anglo-French effort 
could compete on complex weapons, and other areas. The U.S. government ought to 
welcome this cooperation as strengthening Allied capabilities, even if U.S. industry is not 
enthused. 
Conclusion 
From the literature, public statements, interviews, and, above all, actions, it is clear 
that the U.S. has little, if any, reason for concern regarding enhanced Anglo-French defence 
cooperation. Any fears that this would signal a weakening of attention by the UK towards the 
U.S. appear groundless. This latest initiative is driven by practical considerations: reduced 
defence budgets require London and Paris to find new ways to get more bang for the buck. 
There are policy factors that promote enhanced cooperation. The French return to the 
NATO-integrated military command and the policies generally pursued by the Sarkozy 
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government have made it easier for London to seek greater bilateral efforts, and it should be 
noted that the clearly stated U.S. shift in emphasis towards Asia has also prompted the UK 
to re-evaluate the extent to which it needs to focus more on European Allies, which could 
really assist in generating defence capabilities. 
It would appear that the primary U.S. concern lies in how to ensure that the Anglo-
French initiative succeeds. If it does indeed meet the goals that have been set forth, it would 
assist London and Paris in becoming more capable Allies and moving beyond that goal; it 
would be in the interest of the U.S. if the Anglo-French cooperation could be the foundation 
for other European states to also participate and develop their military capabilities. U.S. 
dissatisfaction with the overall European effort in the Libyan campaign was apparent across 
Europe. However, there is no indication that European governments are ready to do more 
on defence, especially with continued economic problems in the Eurozone. 
From a U.S. policy perspective, the recommendation from Arbuthnot is relatively 
straightforward and worth consideration: Washington should simply watch the 
developments. It is hard to imagine active U.S. support for more Anglo-French cooperation, 
particularly as such work on the industrial side might generate negative commentary from 
U.S. defence industry. Moreover, it is hard to imagine such U.S. support having much effect, 
particularly in view of the lack of response in European capitals to the constant U.S. 
requests for European Allies to do more in developing military capabilities. 
However, if the U.S. is genuinely concerned about the level of European military 
spending and, more important, the extent of the military capabilities that Allies can bring to 
any future operations, it has a vested interest in seeing Anglo-French cooperation succeed 
and serve as a vehicle for other Europeans to develop their military forces. Criticism from 
Washington will have a difficult time overcoming the lack of political will and financial 
resources in European capitals for effective national action. The Anglo-French efforts may at 
least provide a vehicle for channeling scarce resources into more effective defence 
spending. Although that may yet turn out to be more of a hope than reality, it is certainly in 
line with U.S. defence and security policy interests, and worthy of support. 
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